Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 43
Issue 1 Winter 2010

Article 2

Transatlantic Merger Control: The Courts and the
Agencies
Mark Leddy
Christopher Cook
James Abell

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Leddy, Mark; Cook, Christopher; and Abell, James (2010) "Transatlantic Merger Control: The Courts and the Agencies," Cornell
International Law Journal: Vol. 43: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol43/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Transatlantic Merger Control: The
Courts and the Agencies
Mark Leddy, Christopher Cook, James Abell and
Georgina Eclair-Heatht
I. The Role of the Agencies and the Courts in EU and U.S.
M erger Control ...........................................
A. Overview of the EU System ............................
B. Overview of the U.S. System ...........................
II. Recent Cases Before the Courts ...........................
A . E U ...................................................
1. A irtours ...........................................
2. Schneider .........................................
3. Tetra Laval ........................................
4. Impala ............................................
B. U .S. C ases ............................................
1. Oracle ............................................
2. Arch Coal .........................................
3. Equitable Resources ................................
4. W hole Foods .......................................
III. The Agencies' Responses .................................
A. European Commission: Constructive Response to
Criticism .............................................
B. United States: Responses by the Agencies ..............
1. DOJ ..............................................
2. FTC ..............................................
IV . A nalysis ..................................................
A . Europe ...............................................
B. U nited States .........................................
1. DOJ ..............................................
2 . FTC ..............................................
V. Closing Thoughts: Expertise vs. Independence ............

26
26
28
30
30
30
32
33
34
37
37
39
40
40
41
41
45
45
48
49
49
51
51
51
52

In a series of merger control case judgments during the past decade,
courts in the United States and the European Union have rejected the
enforcement agencies' interpretations of law, as well as their factual
allegations, in dismissing proposed challenges and in overturning agency
t Mark Leddy is a partner in the Washington office of Cleary Gottlieb Steen &
Hamilton LLP. Christopher Cook is Counsel and Georgina Eclair-Heath is an associate
in the firm's Brussels office. James Abell, J.D. University of Chicago 2008, was an
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decisions.' In so doing, the courts in both jurisdictions
have assumed a
2
central role in shaping current merger control policy.
Disagreements between the courts and agencies are probably
inevitable if the courts are to fulfill their role as an effective independent
check on the agencies' enforcement activities. Constructive judicial
criticism of agency decisions can drive needed procedural and substantive
reform, leading to more effective and predictable merger enforcement. 3 On
the other hand, if the recent criticism from the courts leads the agencies to
become unduly cautious or, worse, to seek ways to circumvent judicial
review, the courts' intervention could turn out to have been
counterproductive.
This Article considers several recent cases in which the EU and U.S.
courts have rejected proposed actions by the- European Commission and
the U.S. enforcement agencies and analyzes how the agencies have
responded to these defeats.
I.

The Role of the Agencies and the Courts in EU and U.S. Merger
Control

A. Overview of the EU System
European competition enforcement is based on an administrative system in which the European Commission (the Commission) 4 has a broad
duty "to apply, in competition matters, the principles laid down by the
Treaty and to guide the conduct of undertakings in light of those principles."' 5 In the field of merger control, this duty requires the Commission to
investigate and hand down decisions clearing, prohibiting, or undoing
notified transactions, according to the procedure set out in Regulation
139/2004 (the EC Merger Regulation). 6 In merger cases, the Commission
7
thus serves as investigator, prosecutor, and judge.
1. See Dany H. Assaf & Sarah K. McLean, It's Not Over Until It's Over: When Is the
Deal Really Done?, 23 ANTITRUST 59, 59-60 (2008); John Temple Lang, Two Important
Merger Regulation Judgments: The Implications of Schneider-Legrand and Tetra LavalSidel, 28 EUROPEAN L. REV. 259, 259-60 (2003).
2. See Assaf & McLean, supra note 1, at 59.
3. Temple Lang, supra note 1, at 260, 271.
4. Within the European Commission, DG Competition is the Directorate responsible for competition. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Commission Reorganises Its Competition Department in Advance of Enlargement 1, IP/03/603 (Apr. 30, 2003). The
Competition Commissioner heads DG Competition, assisted by a director general and
three deputy directors general responsible for operations, mergers and antitrust, and
state aid respectively. See id. Merger cases are handled by specialized merger units in
each directorate, with the directorates divided by economic sectors (e.g., Energy and
Environment; Financial Services and Health-related Markets; and Basic Industries, Manufacturing, and Agriculture). See id.
5. Joined Cases T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-316/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T329/94 and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-931,
para. 149.
6. See Council Regulation, 139/2004, on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 2004 OJ. (L 24), arts. 6, 8.
7. See Temple Lang, supra note 1, at 259-60.
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Having these roles vested in a single authority is acceptable only if
effective due process safeguards and checks and balances constrain the
administration's power. 8 As discussed below, since 2002 the Commission
has put in place a number of internal measures that have undoubtedly contributed to sounder decision-making. 9 Even with the best of intentions,
however, an administrative system will only meet basic standards of fairness and predictability if an independent tribunal oversees the decision
maker. 10

In the EU, the General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance)" l
and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court of Justice)
(together, the EU Courts) provide this check on the Commission. Merger
decisions taken by the Commission may be challenged before the General
Court, and decisions of the General Court may be further appealed on
points of law to the Court of Justice. 1 2 The EU Courts may annul Commission decisions where they find "lack of competence, infringement of an
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule
of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers."' 13 Any natural or
legal person may challenge a Commission decision that directly addresses
14
or individually affects them.
The EU Courts do not have unfettered discretion when reviewing
Commission merger clearance or prohibition decisions.' 5 The EU Courts
8. Bo Vesterdorf, while President of the European Court of First Instance noted that
even the European Commission's procedure for investigating and adjudicating antitrust
cases would be "inherently flawed" as lacking the necessary independence and impartiality, absent effective judicial review by the Court of First Instance.
Bo Vesterdorf,
Judicial Review in EC Competition Law: Reflections on the Role of the Community Courts in
the EC System of Competition Law Enforcement, 1 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 3, 20 (2005)
(noting that the "combination of important powers in a single body can only be acceptable where there is a real opportunity for effective review by another independent and
impartial body.").
9. See Nicholas Levy, Evidentiary Issues in EU Merger Control, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POL-

icy 81, 81-82 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2009).
10. The European Court of Human Rights has held that administrative authorities
can hold decision-making powers as long as they are subject to effective judicial review
by an independent and impartial tribunal. See, e.g.,
Ozturk v.Germany, App. No. 8544/
79, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 409, 410 (1984).
11. The Court of First Instance was renamed the General Court by the Treaty of
Lisbon, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, which entered into force on Dec. 1, 2009.
12. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 2008 OJ. (C 115) 49,
arts. 256, 263 (formerly arts. 225, 230 of the EC Treaty).
13. Id. art. 263.
14. Third parties have the right to appeal a merger decision, provided that they can
demonstrate that the decision directly and individually affects them. See, e.g., Case T-2/
93, Socieot Anonyme a Participation Ouvri~re Compagnie Nationale Air France v.
Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 11-323, paras. 42-47.
15. Case C-12/03 P, Tetra Laval v. Comm'n [Tetra Laval II], 2005 E.C.R. 1-987, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, para. 89 ("The rules on the division of powers between
the Commission and the Community judicature, which are fundamental to the Community institutional system, do not ...

allow the judicature to go further, and ...

to enter

into the merits of the Commission's complex economic assessments or to substitute its
own point of view for that of the institution.").
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cannot engage in a de novo review of the facts and cannot substitute their
views for those of the Commission.' 6 The EU system instead revolves
around the "cornerstone of error."1 7 While the EU Courts may scrutinize
the Commission's factual analysis and are the ultimate arbiters with regard
to matters of law, the Commission has traditionally enjoyed a "margin of
discretion" in relation to complex economic matters, which are often at the
heart of merger control decisicns. 18 In this area, the role of the EU Courts
is limited to "restrained control,"' 9 whereby the courts verify only whether
the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the statement of the reasons for the decision is adequate, "whether the facts have
been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of
'20
appraisal or misuse of powers."
Notwithstanding these stated limitations, in recent years the EU
Courts have increasingly demonstrated a willingness to engage in rigorous
and detailed scrutiny of the Commission's use of evidence in complex
cases. 2 1 Thus, while in theory the EU merger control regime envisages a
delicate institutional balance in which the Commission and the EU Courts
each focus on their primary function of competition policy enforcement
and judicial review respectively, in practice the situation is not always so
2
2
clear cut.

B. Overview of the U.S. System
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for merger enforcement
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR
Act) 23 and Section 7 of the Clayton

Act. 2 4

Like the European Commission,

the U.S. enforcement agencies investigate proposed transactions for potential competition issues. 25 Unlike the EC, however, the FTC and DOJ do not
themselves have the power to prohibit a transaction; 26 the U.S. agencies
must bring suit in federal court and obtain a preliminary injunction to
16. Case T-342/00, Petrolessence SA & Socite de gestion de restauration routire
SA (SG2R) v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-1161, para. 101.
17. Mario Siragusa, Judicial Review of Competition Decisions Under EC Law 66
(Sept. 21, 2004) (Paper for the UK Competition Comm'n), available at http://

www.competition-commission.org.uk/our-role/cc_lectures/judicialcontrol_210904
siragusa.pdf.
18. Tetra Laval II, para. 39.
19. Bo Vesterdorf, Standard of Proof in Merger Cases: Reflections in the Light of Recent
Case Law of the Community Courts, 1 EUR. COMPETITION J. 3, 12 (2005).
20. Case 42/84 Remia BV & Others v. Comm'n, 1985 E.C.R. 2545, para. 4.
21. See, e.g., Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585; Case T-5/02,
Tetra Laval BV v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381.
22. See Jiurgen Schwarze, Judicial Review of European Administrative Procedure, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 100-01 (2004-).
23. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006).
24. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2006)).
25. See NICHOLAS LEVY, EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL LAW: A GUIDE TO THE MERGER
REGULATION § 23.03 (6th ed. 2009).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(f).
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block a merger.2 7
Despite the fact that the U.S. agencies lack the power to prohibit transactions on their own, the enactment of the HSR Act in 1976 greatly
increased the role of the agencies in U.S. merger policy. 28 Prior to the
passage of the HSR Act, companies would often complete a merger before
the agencies had time to conduct a review of the transaction's competitive
implications. 29 This forced the agencies to pursue divestiture remedies in
federal court after the mergers were consummated, placing the agencies in
a weak position. 30 The HSR Act, however, requires companies to notify the
DOJ and the FTC of transactions that meet prescribed jurisdictional thresholds and to observe a waiting period while the agencies review the transaction. 3 1 Under the HSR system, most companies facing a serious objection
to a proposed transaction will seek negotiated remedies rather than challenge the agencies to litigate. 32 Thus, courts issue relatively few decisions
33
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The fact that the courts hear relatively few merger cases does not, however, diminish their role as an independent check on the agencies. The
requirement that the agencies prove to a district judge that a transaction
poses a threat to competition ensures greater rigor in the agencies' decision-making and fact gathering. 3 4 As recent cases have demonstrated,
judges are subjecting the agencies' economic theories and legal arguments
to increasingly sophisticated and rigorous scrutiny. 35 This trend has implications even for cases that never reach the courtroom: in deciding whether
to raise objections against a proposed merger, the agencies must not only
persuade themselves that their concerns are well-founded but must also
consider the likelihood that they can prove their theories in federal court
36
by a preponderance of the relevant evidence.
27. See id.
28. See Scott A. Sher, Closed But Not Forgotten: Government Review of Consummated

Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45

SANTA CLARA

L.

REV.

41, 54 (2005)

(explaining that the HSR Act "eliminate[d] the deleterious effects of post-consummation
challenges" by requiring the parties to pre-notify the agencies prior to merging).
29. See id. at 52.
30. See id. at 53-54.
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a(a), 18a(b), 18a(d).
32. See Sher, supra note 28, at 55.
33. See id.
34. See William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., Address
Before the George Mason University Symposium: Conglomerate Mergers and Range
Effects: It's a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels 26 (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9536.pdf ("After just six weeks at the agency, I
cannot overstate how much knowing we may have to prove our case to an independent
fact-finder disciplines our decisionmaking.").
35. See, e.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1158-65 (N.D.
Cal. 2004).
36. See Kolasky, supra note 34, at 26 ("If we decide in the U.S. to challenge a merger,
we know we may have to go to court to convince a federal judge, by the preponderance
of the evidence after an evidentiary hearing, that the merger may substantially lessen
competition.").
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While both the FTC and the DOJ must seek a preliminary injunction
from a federal district court to prevent a transaction from closing, the agencies have different options for obtaining permanent injunctive relief.3 7 The
DOJ must seek permanent injunctive relief before a federal district court
judge.3 8 The FTC, however, has the option of either seeking a permanent
injunction in federal court or initiating an administrative suit before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 39 This action is commonly known as
"Part 3" litigation. 40 In Part 3 litigation, ALJs preside over complaints
brought by the FTC's Bureau of Competition and decide whether a transaction may substantially lessen competition in violation of the antitrust
laws. 4 1 Parties may appeal ALJ decisions to the full Federal Trade Commission.4 2 If the FTC decides against the defendant, the defendant may appeal
the decision to a U.S. Court of Appeal and, ultimately, to the Supreme
Court.4 3 Some controversial recent changes to the FTC's administrative
litigation process will be discussed in further detail below.
II.

Recent Cases Before the Courts

A.

EU

In the EU, appeals have been brought in only about forty of the
approximately 4,000 Commission merger decisions since the Merger Regulation entered into force in 1990. 4 4 Nonetheless, these decisions have had a
disproportionately large impact on the development of EU merger control.
In particular, landmark judgments of 2002 in Airtours, Schneider, and Tetra
Laval led directly to a substantial overhaul of the European Commission's
internal structure and decision-making practice. 45 More recently, the General Court's judgment in Impala has raised the standard of care required of
46
the Commission even in clearance decisions.
1. Airtours
In June 2002, the General Court annulled the Commission's Airtours/
First Choice decision in which the Commission prohibited the merger of
37. See

ANTITRUST

MODERNIZATION

(2007) [hereinafter COMMISSION

COMM'N,

REPORT

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

138

REPORT].

38. See id.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 37, at 129, 138.

40. Part 3 of the FTC Rules of Practice govern the FTC's administrative enforcement
process. 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 3.2 (2009) (noting that the process laid out in Part 3 applies
to all formal adjudicative proceedings before the FTC, including challenges to mergers
and a wide range of other conduct).
41. See C.F.R. § 3.1; Thomas V. Vakerics, ANTITRUST BAsIcs § 2.0211-21 (36th ed.

2006) (explaining that the Bureau of Competition has primary responsibility within the
FTC for enforcing federal antitrust laws).
42. 16 C.F.R. § 3.52(a) (2009).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
44. This is in stark contrast to cartel and abuse of dominance cases, where a much
larger percentage of Commission decisions are appealed to the EU Courts.
45. See Levy, supra note 9, § 4.03(5)(2).
46. See Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers & Labels Ass'n (Impala, Int'l Ass'n)
v. Comm'n [Impala], 2006 E.C.R. 11-2289, paras. 528-541.
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two U.K. short-haul, foreign-package holiday suppliers on the ground that
the proposed transaction would create a situation of collective dominance. 4 7 In addition to providing important guidance on the application of
the Merger Regulation to situations of collective dominance, this decision
marked the first time the EU Courts overturned a Commission merger pro48
hibition decision.
In its judgment, the General Court criticized the way in which the
Commission had assessed the impact of the proposed merger. 49 In particular, it reproached the Commission for substantiating its finding of collective dominance on what the court viewed as mere "assertions" that the
merger would lead to a higher degree of market concentration, transparency, and interdependence, and would further marginalize smaller
operators or new entrants. 50 The Court held that, far from basing its analysis on "cogent evidence," the Commission's decision was "vitiated by a
series of errors of assessment .... "51 The General Court's judgment not
only provides important guidance as to the legal test for collective dominance but also as to the standard of factual and economic analysis to which
52
the Commission would be held.

Regarding the legal test for collective dominance, the General Court
sets out three cumulative conditions that the Commission must fulfill to
establish anticompetitive collective dominance. 53 The Commission must
show that (1) sufficient market transparency exists to enable participants
to monitor each other's conduct, (2) undertakings have an incentive "not to
depart from the common policy on the market," and (3) the actions of
competitors or consumers "would not jeopardise the results expected from
'54

the common policy."

The General Court's treatment of factual and economic evidence in
Airtours had even broader implications. In contradicting a number of the
Commission's findings, the General Court effectively conducted its own
review of the facts. 55 Thus, the General Court not only appeared to reduce
significantly the deference previously afforded the Commission but also
signaled that it would hold the Commission to a new, higher standard of
56
economic analysis in supporting its conclusions.
47. Case IV/M.524, Airtours/First Choice, 2000 OJ. (L 93) 1, 5 C.M.L.R. 494, overturned in Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n [Airtours Case], 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585.
48. Gisela Aigner, Oliver Budzinski & Arndt Christiansen, The Analysis of Coordinated Effects in EU Merger Control: Where do we stand after Sony/BMG and Impala?, 2
EUR. COMPETITION J. 311, 316 (2006).
49. Alessandro Nucara, Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Laval/Sidel: Fast Track Towards
Merger Reform?, 14 EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW REViEw 193 (2003).
50. Airtours Case, supra note 47, paras. 80, 120, 158, 214, 283-84, 286.
51. Id. para. 294.
52. See Levy, supra note 9, at 94.
53. See Airtours Case, supra note 47, para. 62.
54. Id.
55. See Levy, supra note 9, at 94.
56. Id.
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Schneider

Just four months after the Airtours judgment, the General Court
annulled two prohibition decisions taken by the Commission in Schneider/
Legrand.5 7 These were the first competition judgments brought before the
General Court under the newly introduced expedited appellate
58
procedure.
Following a detailed review of the Commission's decision, and in
pointedly critical language, the Court concluded that the Commission had
committed substantive "errors, omissions and inconsistencies . . . of
undoubted gravity."5 9 The Court found, for example, that the Commission
had based its conclusion that the transaction would create or strengthen
the merged entity's dominant position vis-a-vis wholesalers in markets
outside of France solely on transnational observations, rather than on a
rigorous, country-by-country analysis. 60 In light of these shortcomings in
the Commission's analysis, the Court overturned the prohibition decision
61
in relation to all markets outside of France.
The General Court then reversed the Commission's decision regarding
the French market on the basis of procedural errors committed during the
Commission's investigation. 62 The General Court observed that, between
the statement of objections (the initial decision expressing doubts as to the
transaction's legality) and the prohibition decision, the Commission's
views on this market had changed substantially. 63 In particular, concerns
regarding possible conglomerate effects in associated markets had replaced
the concerns raised in the statement of objections regarding the parties
overlapping activities in France by the time the prohibition decision was
published. 6 4 The General Court held that the Commission had violated
Schneider's rights of defense by including arguments in its decision that
57. See Case COMP/M.2283, Schneider/Legrand, 2004 OJ. (L 101) 1, in which the
Commission prohibited the merger of two French suppliers of low-voltage electricity
distribution equipment. The General Court overturned the Commission's prohibition
decision in Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric SA v. Comm'n [Schneider 1], 2002 E.C.R.
11-4071. In Case T-77/02, Schneider Electric SA v. Comm'n [Schneider II], 2002 E.C.R.
11-4201, the General Court overturned the Commission's divestment order. Under the
French public takeover code, the purchaser may acquire the target shares before antitrust clearance is granted, provided that associated voting rights are not exercised. At
the date of the Commission's prohibition decision, Schneider had acquired shares (with
voting rights suspended) in Legrand. See Schneider II para. 11-12, 20. In addition to its
prohibition decision, therefore, the Commission also issued a second decision ordering
Schneider to divest these shares. See id. para. 28.
58. See Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Judicial Review and Merger Control: The CFI's Expedited Procedure, COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER,

2002, at 7, available at http://

ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2002-3_7.pdf. In Schneider I, the judgment was handed down ten months after appeal; in Schneider II, the judgment was
handed down just five months after request for expedited procedure. See Schneider I,
supra note 60, para. 61; Schneider II, supra note 57, para. 30.
59. See Schneider I, supra note 57, para. 404.
60. See id. paras. 243-44.
61. See id. paras. 262-64.
62. See id. paras. 412, 460-62.
63. See id. 445-53.
64. Id. para. 445.
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were not included in the statement of objections. 65
3.

Tetra Laval

In the Commission's third defeat of 2002, the General Court annulled
the Commission's two decisions in Tetra Laval/Sidel in which the Commission prohibited the merger of two producers of packaging materials and
ordered the de-merger of the two companies. 66 Following a detailed assessment of the Commission's factual analysis, the court again criticized the
67
Commission's reliance on unsubstantiated economic analysis.
The General Court held that, in reaching its decision that the merger
would have anticompetitive conglomerate effects, the Commission had
failed to conduct a precise examination supported by "convincing evidence." 68 In particular, the General Court found that the Commission had
failed to adequately demonstrate that the merged entity would have an
incentive to leverage its dominant position on the carton packaging market
into the plastic packaging machine market, ignored the low shares of the
merging parties in certain overlapping markets, and failed to take into
account the remedies offered by the parties or the strength of their existing
competitors. 6 9 The General Court thus overturned the Commission's prohibition decision on the basis that, absent "convincing evidence" that the
transaction would in all likelihood create or strengthen a dominant posi'70
tion, it constituted a "manifest error of assessment.
The Commission appealed the General Court's judgment to the Court
ofJustice. 7 1 The Commission claimed that the General Court had not only
disregarded its margin of discretion in respect of complex factual and economic assessments but had also exceeded its role in reviewing merger decisions. 72 In particular, it claimed that the General Court had substituted its
own view of the facts for that of the Commission and had imposed on the
65. Id. paras. 460-62. Having annulled the Commission's decision, the General
Court subsequently held that the Commission should pay a portion of the _1.7 billion
demanded by Schneider as compensation for the amount the company claimed it would
have gained had the merger been permitted, including two-thirds of the reduction in the
divestiture price that Schneider conceded when it sold Legrand to Wendel Investissement SA and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. in December 2002. See Case T-351/03,
Schneider Electric SA v Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-2237, 4 C.M.L.R. 1533 (2007). The

Court of Justice annulled this decision on July 16, 2009, on the ground that, as Schneider had no obligation to sell Legrand in 2002, Schneider could not recover losses
incurred in the sale from the Commission. Case C-440/07 P, Comm'n v Schneider Electric SA (not yet reported). However, the Court of Justice held that the Commission must
cover costs incurred by Schneider in appealing the disputed merger control decision. Id.
66. See Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel [Tetra Laval 1], 2004 O.J. (L 43) 13,
overruled by Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381; COMP/
M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel [Tetra Laval II], 2004 O.J. (L 38) 1, overruledby Case T-80/02,
Tetra Laval BV v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4519; see also comments on the French public

takeover code supra note 57.
67. Tetra Laval I, supra note 66 passim.
68. Id. paras. 155, 336.

69. See id. paras. 251, 281, 297.
70. See id. paras. 155, 336.
71. Case C-12/03P, Comm'n v. Tetra Laval BV, 2005 E.C.R. 1-987, para. 1.
72. Id. para. 19.
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Commission a disproportionate standard of proof for merger
73
prohibitions.
The Court of Justice rejected the Commission's claim. 74 While recognizing that the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, the Court of Justice nevertheless noted that this "does not
mean that the Community Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission's interpretation of information of an economic nature." 75 In fact,
the Court of Justice confirmed that the EU Courts must not only "establish
whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent
but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be
taken into account to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable
of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it." 76 The Court of Justice
noted that this is particularly important in cases where "a prospective analysis" is required. 7 7 This was true of the present case, where the Commission based its theory of harm on assumptions about what the merged
company would do in the future. 78 The Court of Justice therefore concluded that the General Court had not exceeded its role in reviewing the
Commission's analysis of the likely anticompetitive conglomerate effects of
79
the merger.
The Court of Justice also rejected the Commission's claim that the
General Court had departed substantially from the standard of proof established by the existing jurisprudence of the EU Courts by requiring it to
provide "convincing evidence". 80 In particular, the Commission recalled
the judgment of the Court of Justice in Kali and Salz,8 1 in which the EU
Courts held that the Commission must provide "cogent and consistent"
evidence. 8 2 However, the Court of Justice in Tetra Laval concluded that the
General Court's use of the words "convincing evidence" had "by no means
added a condition relating to the requisite standard of proof but merely
drew attention to the essential function of evidence, which is to establish
convincingly the merits of an argument or, as in the present case, of a
decision on a merger. "83
4.

Impala

On July 13, 2006, the General Court overturned the Commission's
2004 decision in Sony/BMG, 8 4 a case in which the Commission cleared the
73. Id. para. 31.
74. Id. para. 40.
75. Id. para. 39.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. para. 42.
79. Id. paras.48-51.
80. See id. at para. 45.
81. Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, French Republic & Others v Comm'n (Kali
& Salz), 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, para. 228.
82. See Case C-12/03P, Comm'n v. Tetra Laval BV, 2005 E.C.R. 1-987, para. 40.
83. Id. para. 41.
84. See Case COMP/M.3333, Sony/BMG, 2005 OJ. (L 62) 30. The proposed concentration was assessed under the old Merger Regulation 4064/89, as the new Merger
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proposed merger of the recorded music businesses of Sony Corporation of
America and Bertelsmann AG.8 5 This was the first-and only-time that
86
the General Court annulled an unconditional merger clearance decision.
It was, moreover, one of the first major cases decided after the Commission's decisional practice had been adapted in an effort to meet the higher
87
burden of proof established in the Court's 2002 judgments.
The General Court held that the Commission had committed a number of manifest errors in concluding that no collective dominant position
existed in the market for recorded music prior to the merger and that the
merger would not lead to a situation of collective dominance. 88 The General Court further rejected the Commission's conclusion that there was
insufficient product homogeneity, market transparency, or evidence of
past retaliatory behavior to support the conclusion that the proposed transaction would permit tacit collusion.8 9
In particular, the General Court found that the Commission had failed
to conduct sufficient prospective analysis of the effect of the proposed
transaction on market transparency and the likelihood of retaliation. 90
The General Court also held that the Commission erred by requiring a
higher level of transparency than that necessary to establish the possibility
of effective tacit collusion. 9 1 In rejecting this particular conclusion, the
General Court notably qualified the Airtours collective dominance test by
suggesting, obiter dictum, that "close alignment of prices over a long
period ... together with other factors typical of a collective dominant position, might, in the absence of an alternative reasonable explanation, suffice
92
to demonstrate the existence of a collective dominant position ....
The General Court also criticized the Commission for relying on data
submitted by the notifying parties in response to the statement of objections, without first examining the methods used to gather and verify that it
was "accurate, relevant or objective and representative. '9 3 The General
Court held that the Commission, in relying so heavily on this data, had
effectively "delegate[d], without supervision, responsibility for conducting
94
certain parts of the investigation to the parties to the concentration."
Regulation 139/2004 did not enter into force until May 1, 2004. The transaction was renotified to the Commission under the new Merger Regulation following the General
Court's judgment and was re-approved in October 2007, following a detailed and
lengthy review. This clearance came more than three years after the transaction had
closed and the joint venture had come into operation. Impala has also appealed the
Commission's second clearance decision. As discussed further below, the General
Court's judgment was subsequently overturned in 2008.
85. Impala, supra note 46, paras. 542-43.
86. See Aigner et al., supra note 48, at 311.
87. Id.
88. See Impala, supra note 46, paras. 528, 541.
89. Id. paras. 520, 528, 533-34, 542.
90. See id. para. 528.
91. Id. para. 289.
92. Id. para. 252.
93. See id. para. 415.
94. Id. para. 415.
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The General Court, additionally, departed from existing EU jurisprudence on the role of the statement of objections. 95 It held that, although
not required to explain changes from the statement of objections in its subsequent decision, the Commission must be "in a position to explain. . . its
'96
reasons for considering that its provisional findings were incorrect.
Sony and Bertelsmann appealed the General Court's decision to the
Court of Justice. 97 In a judgment that provides important clarification on
a number of different issues, the Court of Justice annulled the General
Court's decision. 98
First, in a claim that the Commission did not join, Sony and
Bertelsmann argued that the General Court had erred in requiring the
Commission to meet the same burden of proof in the context of a merger
clearance decision as was required in a prohibition decision. 99 The Court
of Justice rejected this claim, explaining that the burden of proof on the
Commission is identical in both clearance and prohibition decisions. 10 0 In
clearing a proposed merger, the Commission must be able to affirmatively
show that the transaction will have pro-competitive effects or will not result
in anticompetitive harm in the same way that it must positively demonstrate anticompetitive effects in cases where it opts to prohibit a merger. 1 1
In both cases, the Commission must support its decision with evidence
1 2
that is "cogent and consistent."
Second, the Court of Justice confirmed that the Commission is neither
"obliged to maintain the factual or legal assessments" made in the statement of objections nor "to explain any differences with respect to its provisional assessments set out in the statement of objections." 10 3 The Court of
Justice found that the General Court had erred in relying on certain portions of the Commission's findings in the statement of objections as being
established facts, recalling that the statement of objections is inherently
provisional and may be amended in light of further evidence received dur10 4
ing the course of the Commission's investigation.
Third, the Court of Justice rejected the General Court's criticism of the
Commission's use of evidence received in response to the statement of
objections.' 0 5 The Court of Justice confirmed that while the Commission
95. Earlier case law had established that, as the statement of objections is merely a
preliminary document setting out preliminaryviews taken in light of evidence received in
the initial stages of the Commission's investigation, the Commission is not required to
explain deviations from the statement of objections. See, e.g., Case C-60/81, IBM v.
Comm'n, 1981 E.C.R. 2639, para. 19.
96. Impala, supra note 46, para 335.
97. Case C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann AG & Sony Corp. of Am. v. Indep. Music Publishers & Labels Ass'n [Impala II], 2008 E.C.R. 1-4951, 5 C.M.L.R. 17 (2008) para. 4.
98. Id. para. 191.
99. Id. para. 40.
100. See id. paras. 46-47.
101. See id. para. 52.
102. Id. para. 50.
103. Id. paras. 64-65.
104. Id. paras. 73, 76.
105. Id. paras. 87-95.
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"is required to examine carefully the arguments of the parties to the concentration" and "to disregard them where justified doubts arise," 10 6 it cannot apply more stringent criteria to this information than to information7
10
received from third parties in response to the statement of objections.
Finally, the Court of Justice rejected the General Court's conclusions
on collective dominance.'l 0 In particular, the Court of Justice criticized
the "watered-down" test applied by the General Court, which, in analyzing
the Commission's findings on market transparency, had merely postulated
a monitoring mechanism based solely on unsubstantiated claims by the
complainant Impala.I 0 9 The Court of Justice thus found that the General
Court had erred in failing to apply the three-pronged test for collective
dominance as set out in the Airtours judgment. 110
B. U.S. Cases
The attitude of the U.S. courts toward agency challenges to proposed
mergers has come a long way since Justice Stewart's oft-quoted dissenting
remark in Von's Grocery that "[t]he sole consistency that I can find is that
under § 7, the Government always wins." 1 1 ' Reflecting a trend dating back
to the 1980s, in four recent cases, the antitrust enforcement agencies have
lost high-profile challenges to proposed mergers. The cases discussed in
this section each involved a unique set of facts but each illustrates the
degree to which the courts influence U.S. merger policy today.
1. Oracle
In United States v. Oracle Corporation,the DOJ challenged a proposed
acquisition of PeopleSoft by Oracle. 112 Both companies developed and
marketed enterprise resource planning (ERP) system software used by large
companies to run significant parts of new businesses, such as supply chain
software, human relations management, and financial management systems. 113 The DOJ sought to define the product markets as "high function"
human relation management and financial management systems, arguing
that these were distinct and separate product markets from all other ERP
106. Id. para. 94.
107. Id.
108. Id. paras. 132-34.
109. Id. paras. 111, 126, 130.
110. Id. paras. 124-34. The General Court's judgment considered only two of
Impala's five grounds of appeal. See id. para. 90. Although the Court of Justice annulled
the General Court's judgment on these two grounds, it remitted the case back to the
General Court to consider the remaining three issues. See id. at 191. On June 30, 2009,
the General Court issued an order stating that the case was devoid of any purpose and
that there was no need for the court to adjudicate on the matters referred back by the
Court of Justice. See Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers & Labels Ass'n v.
Comm'n, 2009 OJ. (C 205) 37-38.
111. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
112. 331 F. Supp.2d 1098 [Oracle], 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
113. Id. at 1101-02.

38

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 43

products. 1 14 In trying to define the market, the DOJ relied primarily on
the testimony of several of Oracle's customers, along with the testimony of
115
industry witnesses and experts.
The trial court was unconvinced and held that the evidence did not
establish the existence of the product market proposed by the DOJ. 11 6 Specifically, Judge Walker emphasized the difficulty in identifying "'clear
breaks in the chain of substitutes' sufficient to justify bright-line market
boundaries in differentiated products unilateral effects cases," such as the
one at issue. 1 1 7 As a result of these difficulties, the court found that
"attempts to create defensible market boundaries are likely to be based on
relatively vague product characteristics," falling short of "section 7's
requirement that the relevant market be 'well-defined.""'1 8 The court
observed that the evidentiary problems faced by the DOJ were inherent in
qualitative analysis and recommended the use of quantitative analysis
using modern econometric methods, such as merger simulation models. 119 The court suggested these methods could assist in reducing the
arbitrariness of, and compensate for potential errors in, market definition
120
in cases involving differentiated products and alleged unilateral effects.
The Oracle decision also demonstrates how judicial skepticism of pre12 1
sumptions under the 1992 Merger Guidelines can affect the outcome.
In its trial brief, the DOJ placed strong emphasis on the fact that
"'[slufficiently large HHI figures establish [a] ... prima facie case that a
merger is anti-competitive."1 2 2 Unconvinced, Judge Walker declared, "[A]
strong presumption of anticompetitive effects based on market concentration is especially problematic in a differentiated products unilateral effects
context."1 23 The court then held that a "presumption of anticompetitive
effects from a combined share of 35% in a differentiated product market
[was] unwarranted" and that a monopoly or dominant position must be
24
proved. 1
The DOJ also failed to convince the court of the validity of its unilateral effects theory. 125 The court held that in a differentiated product market the DOJ must prove that the merging firms' products are close
substitutes, that the non-merging firms likely cannot introduce products to
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1107.
1125.
1132.
1120 (internal citations omitted).
1120-21.

119. Id. at 1122.

120. See id.
121. See Darren S. Tucker, Scott L. Reiter & Kevin L. Yingling, The Customer Is Sometimes Right: The Role of Customer Views in Merger Investigations, 3 J. COMPETIION L. &
ECON. 551, 562 (2007) (discussing judicial skepticism of customer witnesses as representative of the market).
122. Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 17 (citing FTC v. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 (D.C. Cir.
2001)).
123. Oracle, 331 F. Supp.2d at 1122.
124. Id. at 1123.
125. See id. at 1120-22.
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challenge those of the merging firms, and that the other options available
to customers are so different that the merging firms likely can act
26
anticompetitively. 1
2.

Arch Coal

The FTC suffered a similar defeat in FTC v. Arch Coal.12 7 The FTC
brought a challenge to Arch Coal's proposed acquisition of Triton Coal
(Triton) and its mines in Wyoming.1 28 The FTC argued that the relevant
market was coal from the Wyoming South Powder River Basin (SPRB) and
that the sub-category of 8800 Btu SPRB coal was a distinct relevant market. 12 9 The defendants countered that the market was no narrower than
13 0
SPRB coal and could be as broad as all Powder River Basin (PRB) coal.
The court found that the relevant product market involved all SPRB coal,
noting that the FTC's own expert could offer only weak support for the
argument that 8800 Btu SPRB coal was a distinct market and that the
defendants' evidence showed that utility companies could and did switch
3
between 8800 Btu and 8400 Btu SPRB coal.' '
Like the Oracle decision, Arch Coal illustrates how district courts continue to require much more than market concentration data before granting injunctive relief. 132 Whether measured by reserves, practical capacity,
loadout capacity, or production, the market for SPRB coal was highly concentrated. 13 3 Nonetheless, based on the court's determination that
reserves were the correct measure of market concentration, the transaction
resulted in only a small increase in concentration (an increase in HHI of
just forty-nine). 134 By this measure, even though the concentration figures
indicated that the FTC had met its burden of showing a prima facie case,
the case was weak, compared to other challenges brought by the agencies. 1 3 5 Consequently, the court determined that the defendants were permitted to make less of a showing to rebut the prima facie case.1 3 6 The
defendants presented an alternative statistical assessment and a detailed
analysis of both present and post-merger competition in the relevant market, which the court found sufficient to undermine the FTC's prima facie
case. 137
The FTC also failed to convince the court of the validity of its coordi126. Id. at 1117-18.
127. 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004).

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
figures

Id. at 114.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 121-22.
See, e.g., id. at 124.
Id. at 124-25. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) market concentration
ranged from 2054 to 2201. Id. The increase in HHI ranged from forty-nine to

224. Id. at 125.
134. Id. at 124-25.
135. See id. at 129.
136. Id. at 129.
137. Id. at 130.

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 43

nated effects theory. 138 The court pointed to the following factors as making tacit collusion difficult: the significant number of competitors; the
heterogeneity of SPRB coal; imperfect pricing information available in the
market; the difficulty in obtaining accurate information about supply and
demand; the confidentiality of the bidding system; and firms' difficulties in
identifying and punishing cheaters. 139 The court also found that Triton
was unlikely to become a maverick in the SPRB market and that fringe
suppliers in the SPRB market would be a viable constraint on producer
price coordination post-merger.140
3.

Equitable Resources

In FTC v. Equitable Resources, the FTC suffered a defeat on jurisdictional grounds. 14 1 The FTC challenged Equitable Resources, Inc.'s proposed acquisition of People's Natural Gas Company. 142 The transaction
had received the approval of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
(PUC) as being in the public interest. 143 The FTC then alleged that the
transaction would result in reduced competition for a small subset of the
parties' customers. 14 4 The court dismissed the complaint, holding that the
PUC's approval qualified for state action immunity and prevented the FTC
45
from exercising jurisdiction. 1
4. Whole Foods
The most recent high-profile loss by the FTC occurred during its
attempt to obtain a preliminary injunction against Whole Foods Market,
Inc.'s proposed acquisition of its rival, Wild Oats. 146 FTC v. Whole Foods
turned largely on the question of product market definition. 14 7 The FTC
argued that the relevant product market was "premium, natural, and
organic supermarkets" (PNOS), a definition that included only the parties
to the merger and two other firms. 148 The parties argued that they compete in a much broader "all supermarkets" product market. 149 The lower
court considered the "small but significant and nontransitory increase in
price" (SSNIP) test of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, while relying on
"critical loss" analysis as an input to that test.15°
138. See id. at 158.
139. Id. at 150.
140. Id.
141. 512 F. Supp. 2d 361, 372 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
142. Id. at 362-63.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 372.
146. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007).
147. Id. at 7.
148. Id. at 8. The FTC asserted that the combined shares of Whole Foods and Wild
Oats in the premium natural and organic supermarkets would be 100% in seventeen of
the eighteen relevant geographic markets. Id. at 39.
149. Id. at 15.
150. See id. at 17.
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The FTC's main argument was that a "core" group of customers of a
PNOS would not switch to traditional grocery stores in response to a
SSNIP. 15 1 This group of consumers would thus be vulnerable to a sustained increase in price. 152 The lower court disagreed with the FTC on the
product market issue, effectively deciding the case on that issue alone and
allowing the merger to proceed. 15 3 The FTC appealed.
A year later, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit reversed the district court decision 2-1, holding that the district
court had incorrectly analyzed the relevant product market. 154 Rather
than focusing on harm to "fringe" customers who would shop at both premium supermarkets and conventional supermarkets, the appellate court
held that the district court should have focused on the effect on "core"
consumers who rely entirely on premium supermarkets. 1 5 5 Moreover, the
court held that when the FTC seeks a preliminary injunction, it need not
have finally resolved its relevant market definition. 156 The most far-reaching aspect of the decision, however, was the court's announcement that the
FTC need only raise "serious doubts about a transaction" to prevail at the
preliminary injunction stage rather than satisfy the traditional four-part
15 7
test.
III.
A.

The Agencies' Responses
European Commission: Constructive Response to Criticism

While the General Court's judgments in Airtours, Schneider, and Tetra
Laval acknowledged that the Commission has a margin of discretion when
dealing with complex economic matters, they nonetheless demonstrated
that the CFI will scrutinize not only the facts relied on by the Commission
but also the inferences it draws from them. These cases sent a strong message that the Commission needed to become more rigorous in its investigations, evidence, and reasoning-a message the Commission received
clearly. 15 8 Mario Monti, then Competition Commissioner, acknowledged
that there were "lessons to be drawn from the judgments," explaining that
"the [General Court] is now holding us to a very high standard of proof,
and this has clear implications for the way in which we conduct our investi15 9
gations and draft our decisions."'
151. Id. at 16-17.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 39, 50. Judge Friedman explained that his rejection of the FTC's product market definition meant that "there [was] no need to analyze specific HHI calculations." Id. at 39.
154. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
155. Id. at 1037, 1041.
156. Id. at 1049.
157. Id. at 1036.
158. Levy, supra note 9, at 109; Mario Monti, Eur. Comm'r for Competition Pol'y,
Merger Control in the European Union: A Radical Reform 2 (Nov.7, 2002), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference-SPEECH/02/545&formatPDF&aged=l&language-EN&guiLanguage=EN).
159. Monti, supra note 158, at 2.
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The Commission was quick to address the issues highlighted by the
General Court. 160 It had become clear well before 2002 that DG Competition's specialized Merger Task Force, which then reviewed all mergers notified to the Commission, was understaffed, inadequately resourced, and
lacked access to both economists and econometric software. 16 1 More fundamentally, the string of defeats at the General Court also made it apparent that internal checks on the Merger Task Force were insufficient, leaving
too much influence over Commission decision-making in the hands of the
individuals who investigated cases. 16 2 The Commission heeded the General Court's criticisms and pushed ahead with a substantial program of
institutional and procedural reforms. 16 3 Key changes included the adoption of the new Merger Regulation 164 and the Commission's Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, 165 the creation of the post of Chief Competition Economist, 166 the introduction of a "peer review" or "devil's advocate" panel procedure to provide independent scrutiny of key recommendations of case
teams,' 6 7 the disbanding of the Merger Task Force, and the reorganization
168
of DG COMP into sectoral units.
The 2004 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, together with the revised substantive test and extended timetable for both Phase I and Phase II investigations introduced by the new Merger Regulation, established a more
structured analytical framework for merger assessments. 16 9 In particular,
the guidelines identified more clearly the types of evidence relevant to different theories of competitive harm. 170 They also adopted the concepts of
160. Levy, supra note 9, at 109; Monti, supra note 158.
161. Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Reforming European Merger Review: Targeting Problem Areas in
Policy Outcomes, 2 J.INDUS., COMPETITION & TRADE 311, 328-30 (2002); Monti, supra
note 158 (suggesting that the need for reform became apparent in July of 2000, following the submission of a report to the Council on the function of merger review).
162. See Levy, supra note 9, at 113, 116-17.
163. See id. at 109. The Commission had already instigated a reform process in July
2000, when the Commission submitted a Report to the Council on the application and
functioning of the Merger Regulation. See Monti, supra note 158. The Commission
then, in December of 2001, adopted a Green Paper on the reform of the ECMR on which
third parties could comment. See Anne Papaioannou et al., Green Paperon the Review of
the Merger Regulation, COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER 65 (Feb. 2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2002_1_65.pdf.
164. See Council Regulation, 139/2004, supra note 6.
165. Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 Oj. (C 31) 5.
166. See Levy, supra note 9, at 82.
167. Brad Staples, Communicating in a New European Union Competition Environment,
GLOBAL COMPETITION REVEw (2005).
168. See Press Release, supra note 4.
169. See Council Regulation, 139/2004, supra note 6 (explaining that the new test
examines whether or not a notified concentration would significantly impede effective
competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result
of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.) Cf. the old test, which examines whether "a concentration ... which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a
result of which effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it
would be significantly impeded should be declared incompatible with the common market." Id. at para. 24.
170. See id. passim.
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coordinated effects and non-coordinated effects and incorporated the three171
pronged Airtours test.

The appointment of the Chief Competition Economist and his team in
2003 reflected the Commission's recognition of the need to place greater
emphasis in its decisions on detailed quantitative and economic evi-

dence. 1 7 2 The Chief Economist is, by design, temporarily seconded to the
Commission.1 7 3 This arrangement ensures that the incumbent has both

real-world knowledge of industrial economics and a future outside the
Commission, which is intended to further ensure a measure of objectivity. 1 7 4 Supported by a team of economists, 1 75 the Chief Economist provides economic guidance from the beginning of the investigation process,
encouraging merging parties to perform robust economic analysis that they
176
can support with reliable evidence.
Peer review panels, first introduced in Carnival/P&O Princess,1 77
became a systematic feature of Phase II merger cases from May 1, 2004.178
The panels consist of experienced officials from across DG COMP and are
intended to provide an effective internal check on investigators' prelimi179
nary conclusions.
Finally, the Commission dissolved the Merger Task Force and integrated its constituent units into five sectoral directorates within DG COMP
that are responsible for certain industrial sectors. 18 0 Each of these units
has a dedicated merger unit working alongside units dealing with cartels
and general abuse of dominance cases. 18 1
The reforms begun in 2004 sought to establish a "more systematic and
171. See Council Regulation, 139/2004, supra note 6, paras. 24, 39, 41.
172. See Levy, supra note 9, at 112-13.
173. Monti, supra note 158, at 7.
174. See id. (indicating that the role of the Chief Economist is designed to blend
hands-on experience with an independent outlook). The Chief Economist also reports
directly to the Director General for Competition to preserve a degree of independence
from individual case handlers or case teams. See Levy, supra note 9, at 112.
175. Levy, supra note 9, at 112. The Chief Economist is currently supported by about
twenty economists. Id.
176. See Lars-Hendrik Roller & Pierre A. Buigues, The Office of the Chief Competition
Economist at the European Commission, (May 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
competition/officechiefecon ec.pdf.
177. See Case COMP/M.2706, Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess, 2003 OJ. (L
248) 1;Jeremy Grant & Damien J. Neven, The Attempted Merger Between GeneralElectric
and Honeywell: A Case Study of TransatlanticConflict, 1 J. COMPETTION L. & EcON. 595,
631 n.78 (2005) (noting that Commissioner Monti unexpectedly cleared the Carnival
merger after using a team of officers to challenge the team handling the case).
178. Philip Lowe, Dir. Gen. of the Competition, Address to the IBA Conference: The
focus of DG Competition in 2003-2004 2 (Feb. 27, 2003).
179. Levy, supra note 9, at 116-17. Questions remain as to whether such panels can
offer truly effective scrutiny given the limited time available for review and panel members' lack of familiarity with the facts of the case. See, e.g., Temple Lang, supra note 1, at
271-72.
180. Nicholas Levy, Mario Monti's Legacy in EC Merger Control, 1 COMPETITION POLICY
INT'L 99, 130 (2005).
181. Press Release, supra note 4, at 1.
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rigorous framework based on sound and robust evidence." 18 2 As one of
the first major cases in which the Commission sought to make more extensive use of economic evidence and to conduct a more systematic assessment of a proposed transaction, the General Court's annulment of the
Commission's Sony/BMG decision was a significant blow to the
183
Commission.
In particular, the criticism of the Commission's reliance on the parties' data raised concerns that, in an effort to avoid similar problems in the
future, the Commission would react by issuing multiple, detailed information requests in even the most straightforward of cases. 184 While the
Court of Justice's Impalajudgment may have allayed some of these fears, it
is nonetheless clear to EU competition law practitioners that the Commission's demands for information-not only from the merging parties but
also from third parties, including those that may have no interest in the
case-have become more lengthy and demanding.1 8 5 The Courts' requirement that Commission decisions be more thoroughly grounded in clear,
quantitative evidence has thus increased the burden on merging parties
(and third parties) throughout the administrative process.'8 6 The use of
economists has also become commonplace at both an earlier stage and to a
18 7
greater extent than previously.
Investigatory review periods have also become longer.18 8 While strict
timelines govern the Commission's review of proposed mergers, the
increased use of quantitative evidence has created a significant administrative burden, with the merging parties, third parties, and the Commission,
alike, requiring time to gather, process, and review substantial quantities of
data. 189 This has, in some cases, led to the suspension of the Merger Regulation timetable-a measure now permitted under the new Merger Regulation. 190 Other developments, such as the right of merging parties to review
the Commission's file on receipt of a statement of objections and further
investigative measures taken by the Commission on the basis of the parties'
response to the statement of objections, have also placed greater pressure
19 1
on the Commission's timeline for the review of transactions.
Greater information-gathering burdens and longer, less certain review
timetables may be the inevitable consequences for merging parties of the
higher evidentiary requirements that the EU Courts have imposed on the
Commission. As long as the Commission exercises appropriate discretion
in the demands it imposes, however, these consequences may be a reasona182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Levy, supra note 9, at 149.
See id.at 125.
See id. at 150.
See id. at 150.
See id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 151.
See id.
Council Regulation, 139/2004, supra note 164, art. 10(3).
See id.at 151-52.
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ble price to pay if the result is sounder, and more transparent, decisionmaking.
B. United States: Responses by the Agencies
The simple fact that two U.S. enforcement agencies exist to enforce
merger policy, rather than one, can lead to a perception that the agencies
apply different standards to the cases they review. 19 2 Real or perceived
divergence between the DOJ and FTC can undermine the development of a
uniform approach to merger enforcement in the U.S. and add uncertainty
to the review process. 193 The Antitrust Modernization Commission recognized the potential negative consequences of agency divergence and even
urged Congress to ensure that the DOJ and FTC maintain a uniform
19 4
approach to mergers.
1.

DOJ

In public statements announcing decisions not to challenge several
significant transactions, the DOJ used reasoning similar to that used by the
district courts in Oracle, Arch Coal, and Whole Foods, consistent with these
courts' admonitions to apply a rigorous standard of review. 195 One can
also read these statements to reflect a healthy respect for the difficulties of
carrying the burden of proof to establish a likely anticompetitive effect of a
96

transaction. 1

First, in one of the largest telecom mergers in recent history, the DOJ
approved AT&T's acquisition of Bellsouth without divestitures. 197 The
DOJ considered that the merged company would continue to face vigorous
competition in all markets in which AT&T and Bellsouth had formerly
competed. 198 The combination had raised some fears that the merger
would partially revive the former AT&T monopoly,' 9 9 but the DOJ noted
that changes in the regulatory and technological landscape had signifi192. See

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 37, at 141.
193. See id. at 131.
194. Id. at 131.
195. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., Statement Regarding the Closing of the Investigation of AT&T's Acquisition of Bellsouth: Investigation Concludes
That Combination Would Not Reduce Competition (Oct. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Barnett
Statement], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press releases/2006/
218904.htm; Dep't ofJustice Antitrust Div., Statement on the Closing of Its Investigation
of Whirlpool's Acquisition of Maytag, (Mar. 29, 2006) available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press -releases/2006/215326.htm.
196. See Barnett Statement, supra note 195; Dep't of Justice Statement on Maytag,
supra note 195.
197. See Barnett Statement, supra note 195; Dep't of Justice Statement on Maytag,
supra note 195; Henry M. Rivera & Edgar Class, The Year in Wireline Communications
2006-2007, 920 PRAc. L. INST. 7, 59-60 (2007) (discussing the magnitude of the AT&TBellsouth merger).
198. See id.
199. See, e.g., Ma Bell Revives; Watch Her with a Very Wary Eye, USA TODAY, Mar. 6,
2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-03-06-mabell-editx.htm.
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cantly altered the competitive situation in the telecom market. 200 In the
market for residential local and long distance services, the DOJ noted that
AT&T's competitive significance continued to decline and thus the transaction did not represent a threat to consumers. 20 1 This seems to echo Arch
Coal, where Judge Bates conducted a similar examination of the FTC's theory that Triton was a "maverick firm" but concluded that Triton's declining
performance indicated that the company was no longer as competitively
20 2
relevant.
Second, indications of profound changes in the competitive landscape
in household appliances played a significant role in the DOJ's decision not
to challenge the acquisition of Maytag by Whirlpool. 20 3 Even though the
two companies enjoyed a relatively high market share in laundry product
sales, the DOJ concluded that the combined entity would still face significant constraints that would prevent it from raising prices. 20 4 Domestic
competitors had significant excess production capacity that could be
brought online, and foreign competitors could readily increase their
imports in response to any price increase by domestic firms. 205 In other
words, large retailers such as Best Buy, Sears, The Home Depot, and Lowe's
had sufficient alternatives available that would allow them to resist any
attempt to increase price. 20 6 Finally, the parties presented convincing evidence that the transaction would result in significant cost savings that
20 7
would ultimately benefit consumers.
The closing statement issued in Maytag/lVhirlpool also revealed some
skepticism toward presumptions based on market concentration. 20 8
Though the DOJ acknowledges that the parties' then-current market shares
were high, it concluded that the ability of both foreign and domestic competitors to quickly respond to a price increase would place significant competitive constraints on the merged firm. 20 9 The same line of reasoning was
central to the judgment in Arch Coal.210 In that case, the court noted that
two competing firms would likely expand production in response to a
coordinated price increase, thus mitigating any fears that the merger might
result in tacit collusion. The court also rejected the presumption that
21 1
increased concentration would result in reduced competition.
Third, the DOJ's statement regarding the merger of Sirius and XM satellite radio provides a somewhat more detailed explanation of the DOJ's
200. Barnett Statement, supra note 195.

201. Id.
202. See FTC v. Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
203. See Dep't of Justice Statement on Closing Maytag, supra note 195.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id. (finding that "despite the two companies' relatively high share of laundry
product sales in the United States, any attempt to raise prices likely would be unsuccessful") (emphasis added).
209. Id.
210. FTC v. Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
211. Id. at 149-50.
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rationale for closing an investigation into a case that, at least on its face,
struck many observers as problematic. 2 12 The transaction involved the
merger of the only two providers of satellite radio services. 2 13 The DOJ
analyzed the market for satellite radio and concluded that Sirius and XM
did not, in fact, exercise significant competitive constraint on one
another. 2 14 The parties did not compete for existing customers-those
who already owned a satellite receiver-because their equipment was
incompatible with each other's broadcast service. 2 15 As to new customers,
the DOJ's analysis showed that auto manufacturers, which install the
equipment in new cars, had become one of the most important distribution channels for the two companies. 2 16 While XM and Sirius had historically competed for these customers, they had each entered into sole-source
contracts with all of the major automobile manufacturers at the time of the
transaction. 2 17 These contracts fixed the amount of subsidies and other
incentives that the parties offered until 2012.218 Thus, there would be no
significant competition for this important part of the market over the shortto-medium term.

2 19

Retailers who offered automobile aftermarket equipment and other
stand-alone equipment constituted the second major distribution channel
for XM and Sirius. 220 With regard to this distribution channel, the DOJ
declined to adopt a narrow market definition that only included satellite
radio but, instead, also examined other audio entertainment sources, such
as FM/AM radio, HD Radio, and MP3 players. 2 21 The DOJ's analysis concluded that for a large subset of the merging parties' customers who
bought one satellite radio service for specific programming content, the
other satellite service was not the closest substitute. 2 22 The number of satellite customers who did view the two services as the closest substitutes
was not large enough to make a post-merger price increase profitable, and
the parties lacked the ability to effectively price discriminate among
customers.223
The DOJ's closing statement in Sirius/XM underscored the critical
importance of market definition. Commentators observed that if the DOJ
had defined the relevant market as satellite radio services, then the merger
212. See generally Statement of the Dep't of Justice Antitrust Div. on Its Decision to
Close Its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.'s Merger with Sirius Satellite
Radio Inc. (Mar. 24, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2008/231467.htm; Elinor Mills, FAQ: Serious Challenges for Sirius-XM Merger,
CNET News (Feb. 20, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1026_3-6160765.html.
213. See Statement of the Dep't of Justice on Closing XM Radio, supra note 212, at 1.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 2.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2-3.
219. See id. at 3.
220. Id. at 2.
221. Id. at 3.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 4.
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would essentially lead to a monopoly. 22 4 In defining a broader market,
however, the DOJ pointed to evidence that many customers viewed other
225
sources of audio entertainment as substitutes for satellite radio.
The DOJ's analysis on the satellite radio case echoes the debates both
in Whole Foods, about whether the relevant market consisted of PNOS grocery stores or all supermarkets, and in People Soft/Oracle about high-function business software. 2 26 It is, of course, difficult to determine just what
effect these judicial opinions had on the DOJ's subsequent enforcement
decisions, but at a minimum, it would seem that they reinforce the need for
careful factual inquiry before making a court challenge in which the
2 27
enforcement agency must carry the burden of proof.
2.

FTC

As noted earlier in Part I.B, while the FTC must obtain a preliminary
injunction from a federal court to block a transaction, the FTC may either
pursue administrative litigation within the FTC or seek a permanent
injunction from the federal court. 22 8 In apparent response to its recent
defeats in court, the FTC has modified the administrative litigation process
and, at least arguably, enhanced its role and its decision-making power in
merger cases.

2 29

The FTC's new rules set new deadlines for the pre-hearing phase of
administrative proceedings, including, in cases seeking injunctive relief, an
230
administrative hearing within five months of the filing of the complaint.
The rules also reduce the overall timeline for the proceeding by requiring
23 1
the FTC to decide pre-hearing motions within forty-five days of filing.
In addition, hearings now may not exceed 210 hours (or thirty trial days of
seven hours), and the ALJ must file an initial decision within seventy days
of the filing of the final merits briefs. 2 32 These rules largely codify the
procedures adopted by FTC Commissioner Rosch when he sat as an ALJ
presiding over the decision in In re Inova Health Systems Foundation,which
224. See. e.g., Mills, supra note 212.
225. See Dep't of Justice Statement on Closing XM Radio, supra note 212, at 3.
226. See discussion supra, at Parts II.B.1, II.B.4. Like the DOJ in Sirius/XM, the court
in Whole Foods concluded that "fringe" customers who would respond to a price
increase indicated that the market definition should be broadened, even if "core" customers would not respond to the same price increase. 502 F.Supp.2d 1, 23 (D.D.C.
2007).
227. See Dep't of Justice Statement on Closing XM Radio, supra note 212, at 5.
228. Commission Report, supra note 37.
229. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues Final Rules Amending Parts 3 and 4 of the
Agency's Rules of Practice, (Apr. 27, 2009), available at http://www2.ftc.gov/opa/2009/
04/part3.shtm.
230. 74 Fed. Reg. 1820 (proposed Jan 13, 2009) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R.
§ 3.1 (b)).
231. Id. at 1821 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 3.22(a)).
232. Id. at 1831, 1834 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. at §§ 3.41(b) and 3.51,
respectively).
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itself generated controversy. 2 33 In that case, the two hospital systems interested in merging ultimately terminated their agreement, attributing the dissolution of the merger to "unusual process changes by the Federal Trade
Commission [that] threatened to prolong completion of the merger by as
much as two years, which both health systems believe is not in the best
234
interest of the communities they serve."
In addition to streamlining the administrative litigation process, the
changes to 16 C.F.R. § 3.26 may indicate a significant change in one of the
FTC's longstanding policies. Historically, the FTC did not pursue administrative litigation after a federal district court had denied a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. 23 5 This was reflected in the FTC's 1995 Policy

Statement, which outlined the FTC's case-by-case approach to Part 3 litigation in instances where a preliminary injunction had been denied. 23 6 In its
recent revisions to § 3.26, the FTC stated it will continue to pursue this
case-by-case approach, 23 7 but the revisions eliminate the provision for
automatic removal from adjudication after the FTC loses a motion for a
preliminary injunction in federal court. 2 38

Some commentators have

voiced concerns that these changes, along with the accompanying FTC
statements, indicate that the FTC has in effect reversed its 1995 Policy
statement and would pursue Part 3 administrative litigation on a more frequent basis even after it loses a preliminary injunction motion in federal
court. 23 9 The FTC has claimed that these fears are unfounded. 240 However, the result of these changes remains to be seen.
IV.
A.

Analysis
Europe

Prior to the General Court's 2002 judgments, there had been concern
among companies and practitioners that the Commission (and particularly
DG Competition's Merger Task Force) was exercising virtually unfettered
discretion in approving or prohibiting mergers, unchecked by effective judicial review. 24 1 The three General Court judgments of that year established
clear limits on the Commission's discretion in the use of evidence in its
233. See id.; In re Inova Health System Foundation, No. 061-0166 (May 30, 2008)
(order denying respondent's motion to stay administrative proceedings), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9326/080530orderdenying.pdf.
234. Press Release, Inova Health System, Statement from Inova Health System and
Prince William Health System about the Proposed Merger (June 6, 2008), available at
http://newsroom.inova.org/articledisplay.cfm?articleid=5135.
235. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 37, at 141.

236. 74 Fed. Reg. 1811.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. (outlining concerns of comments received on proposed changes to § 3.26).
240. See id. at 1812.
241. See e.g., Kolasky, supra at note 34, at 26 (commenting that "in Europe, the Commission is sometimes said to act as investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury. Judicial
review is slow and highly deferential to the Commission's factual determinations.").
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decision-making process. 2 42 In response to the stinging, unprecedented

criticism from the court, the Commission embarked on a large-scale program of institutional reform. 243 Most observers believe that the Commis-

sion now grounds its decisions more firmly in fact and economics, 2 44 a
positive development for European merger control as a whole.
The changes observed in the Commission's practices since the General Court's 2006 Impala judgment (overturning a clearance decision) are
perhaps less unambiguously positive. Notwithstanding its subsequent
annulment by the Court of Justice, this decision appears to have pushed
the Commission to further modify and lengthen its procedures in order to
avoid similar confrontations with the Courts in the future. 24 5 As noted
above, the Commission's information demands have become substantially
greater. 24 6 In cases raising genuine issues, merging parties will probably
prefer this added administrative burden over the pre-2002 alternative of
potentially unchecked decision-making. 24 7 However, this comes as small
comfort to third parties who must often devote substantial resources to
answering Commission information requests in cases in which they have
24 8
little or no interest.
Moreover, since Impala, the now real threat of third-party appeals in
clearance decisions means that the Commission tends to investigate even
theoretical concerns thoroughly, causing undue delay (as the Commission's expectations for pre-notification discussions have grown) and
imposing substantial costs on business without clear justification. 2 49
Companies are thus increasingly dependent on the discretion of a (naturally risk-averse) case team to avoid costly burdens in cases where no concern could reasonably arise and when the final outcome of unconditional
250
clearance is never in question.
More generally, to the extent that Impala increases merger litigation, it
is unclear whether the EU Courts can deal quickly and effectively with a
large number of complex cases. 25 1 These courts were over-stretched by the
time the General Court handed down its 2002 judgments. 2 52 The "FastTrack" procedure introduced by the General Court in February 2001 went
some way toward dealing with this issue of timing. 25 3 Nonetheless, Impala
could lead to a further slowing of an already slow appellate process.
242. See Vesterdorf, supra at note 19, at 17.
243. See Levy, supra note 9, at 108.
244. Id. at 149.
245. Id. at 151.
246. See id. at 151.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See Aigner et al., supra note 48, at 331.
250. See Werner Berg, The New EC Merger Regulation: A FirstAssessment of Its Practical Impact, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 683 (2004).
251. See Vesterdorf, supra note 19, at 17.
252. See Levy, supra note 9.
253. Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities,
art. 76a (1), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/
2008-09/txt7 2008-09-25_14-08-6_431.pdf; see also Court of Justice and Court of First
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B.

United States

1.

DOJ

It has been suggested that U.S. agencies' recent litigation defeats in
Oracle, Equitable Resources, and Whole Foods may have had an influence at
least on the DOJ's merger enforcement policy. 25 4 In particular, the DOJ's
closing statements in AT&T/Bellsouth, Maytag/Whirlpool and XM/Sirius
2 55
suggest that litigation risks might have received substantial attention.
Whether or not the litigation losses affected these merger decisions, it certainly is prudent for an enforcement agency to consider whether it has a
reasonable chance of prevailing in court before it undertakes to challenge a
transaction that may have significant benefits to customers and shareholders. This approach to enforcement should not be attributed simply to a
,'more conservative" attitude toward merger enforcement-it is just as likely
a reflection of a rigorous review of the facts and a realistic assessment of
2 56
litigation risks.
In the United States, the agencies' decisions to permit a transaction
are not subject to judicial review. In contrast, the General Court's decision
in Sony/BMG demonstrates that the EU courts have the power to overturn
European Commission decisions permitting mergers, as well as those challenging them. 2 57 At least in theory, then, the General Court can act as a
check not only on overly aggressive enforcement but also on perceived
under-enforcement. On the other hand, unlike in the EU, in addition to the
federal agencies, private parties and State Attorneys General can also challenge transactions under the Clayton Act if they believe that the federal
2 58
agencies are under-enforcing this statute.
2.

FTC

The FTC's reforms to the Part 3 litigation process looked to some
observers like an attempt to create greater independence from the federal
courts in challenging mergers. 2 59 Commentators have noted with some
concern the increased role that the FTC could play as both prosecutor and
Instance Practice Directions, 2002 O.J. (L 87) 48, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri-OJ:L:2002:087:0048:0051:EN:PDF; Levy, supra note 9.
254. See Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, ANTITRUST 22 (Summer 2008); Jason McLure, Has the
Antitrust Division Lost its Nerve?, LEGAL TIMES (Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/
ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=1168423328747 (discussing the impact of the DOJ's loss in
Oracle).
255. See generally Statement of the Dep't of Justice on XM Radio, supra note 212;
Statement of the Dep't of Justice on Closing Maytag, supra note 195.
256. See McLure, supra note 254.
257. See generally Impala, supra note 46.
258. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c, 16(b)(4).
259. See, e.g., Janet L. McDavid & Richard G. Parker, Recent FederalAgency Antitrust
Merger Enforcement, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: CORPORATE LAW AND P CTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES

153 (2009).
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judge under the proposals. 260 For example, if a party files a motion to
dismiss before the administrative hearing, the FTC (and not an ALJ) could
itself review a decision on that motion shortly after voting to issue the complaint. 26 1 This system raises significant questions of whether prosecutorial

bias or a conflict of interest would impact the FTC's rulings on pre-hearing
motions. 262

Of even greater concern to some is the possibility that the FTC may
now more willingly pursue Part 3 litigation, even after a district court has
denied preliminary injunctive relief. 26 3 As Whole Foods argued in its most

recent lawsuit against the FTC, this raises significant questions of
prosecutorial bias and constitutional due process. 26 4 If the FTC argues as
a litigant in federal district court, it seems reasonable to question whether
the FTC can possibly act as an impartial judge in subsequent Part 3
26 5
litigation.
While the FTC may have disagreed with the outcomes in Whole Foods,
Arch Coal, and Equitable Resources, it may not have responded appropri-

ately with its reforms to the merger review process. Under the FTC's proposal, the FTC would only be subject to final appellate review by the D.C.
Circuit after the conclusion of Part 3 litigation. 26 6 While the FTC would
still lack the power to enjoin a merger before its completion, the prospect of
such a long litigation period could well cause the parties to abandon challenged transactions. 2 6 7 Thus, the FTC might have a defacto power to block
2 68
at least some mergers.
V. Closing Thoughts: Expertise vs. Independence
In recent years, the courts in the EU and in the United States seem to
have played an increasingly important role in EU and U.S. merger control
policy. However, the recent disagreements between the courts and the
agencies underscore the recurring question of how to balance the goal of
having mergers assessed by presumably expert agencies with the need for
independent judicial review. The increasing importance of economics in
260. See, e.g., A.B.A. SECTI ON OF ANTITRUST L., 2008 Transition Report 31 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2008/ 11-08/comments-obama
biden.pdf.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See 73 Fed. Reg. 58,837 (proposed Oct. 7, 2008) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts.
3, 4).
264. See Complaint at 28, Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. v. FTC (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 1:08-cv02121 ) [hereinafter Whole Foods Complaint].
265. See id.
266. See 73 Fed. Reg. 58,837 (proposed Oct. 7, 2008) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts.

3, 4).
267. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Consent Order Settles Charges that Whole
Foods' Acquisition of Rival Wild Oats was Anticompetitive (Mar. 6, 2009), http://
www2.ftc.gov/opa/2009/03/wholefoods.shtm. It is notable that the merger between
Whole Foods and Wild Oats was announced on February 21, 2007, and the parties did
not settle the case until March 6, 2009. See id.
268. See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L. Ray. 1, 54 (2008).
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merger analysis has made merger cases (and antitrust cases generally)
among the most complex and difficult to bring to court. 26 9 It can prove
daunting for even an experienced judge to deal "with questions involving
merger simulations, demand elasticity, critical loss analysis, . . . [and] conflicting econometric analyses."' 2 70 In some cases, the complexity may
2 71
prove overwhelming to lay judges, resulting in higher rates of appeal.
The FTC (like the European Commission) has expertise in antitrust
law that many district judges lack, giving it an advantage in deciding complex merger cases. However, the FTC's recent proposals also raise con27 2
cerns about prosecutorial bias and lack of effective judicial oversight.
These same issues arose regarding merger enforcement by the European
Commission and remained unaddressed until the General Court's 2002
judgments and the subsequent institutional reforms implemented by the
European Commission in response-mitigating, but not eliminating, the
problem. 2 73 Giving even an expert agency the effective power to prohibit
mergers, unconstrained by genuinely effective judicial review, is not an
274
optimal solution.
There have been suggestions, both in the United States and in Europe,
to establish specialized competition courts. 2 7 5 A specialized court offers
the possibility of maintaining independent judicial review, while at the
same time promoting the development of judicial expertise in competition
law. 2 76 Several jurisdictions have adopted this model with apparent suc27 7
cess, and the basic idea is not unknown in the United States or Europe.
The United States has already adopted a specialized court for patent law
278
with the creation of the Federal Circuit.
The idea of a specialized competition court has been raised in the EU,
with some suggesting the creation of a specialized chamber of the General
Court for handling complex competition cases. 2 79 While the courts' influ-

269. See generally Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated
for GeneralistJudges? The Impact of Economic Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals
(George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-07),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1319888.
270. Id. at 2. The fact that in the EU system, the courts hear merger cases only on
appeal makes this issue somewhat less difficult, but even there the challenge for lay
judges to deal with antitrust cases is evident.
271. See id. at 28.
272. See, e.g., Whole Foods Complaint, supra note 264.
273. See Levy, supra note 9, at 107.
274. See id. at 298-00.
275. See, e.g., Baye & Wright, supra note 269, at 31; Vesterdorf, supra note 19; Monti,
supra note 158.
276. See id.
277. See Competition Appeal Tribunal-About the Tribunal, http://www.catribunal.
org.uk/242/About-the-Tribunal.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). For example, the
United Kingdom's competition regime features a Competition Appeal Tribunal, a specialized appellate body made up of lawyers, economists, and businessmen. Id. The CAT
hears appeals from decisions made by the U.K.'s antitrust enforcement agency (the
Office of Fair Trading), as well as hearing private claims for monetary damages. See id.
278. Federal Circuit-About the Court, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html.
279. See, e.g., Vesterdorf, supra note 19, at 25.
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ence over EU and U.S. merger control policy over the last decade has been
for the most part positive, placing this increasing power in the hands of
judges more experienced in antitrust law might reduce judicial conflict
with the enforcement agencies and lead to improved decision-making.
On the other hand, it was the non-specialist judges in the EU and the
United States who challenged the agencies to prove their assertions, and
there exists a possibility specialist judges would have developed their own
enforcement biases precisely because of their specializations. There are
strong pros and cons on both sides of the "specialist court" issue, and an
examination of those arguments is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice
it to say, however, that proponents of this idea will have to make a far
stronger argument in the United States and in the EU than they have to
date to succeed.

